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ADVERSARY JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS: IMPEACHMENT OF JUVENILE
DEFENDANTS BY THE USE OF PREVIOUS
ADJUDICATIONS OF DELINQUENCY
DAVID

L. HERBERT*

V. LEE SINCLAIR, JR.t

INTRODUCTION

N ADULT CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, any defendant who wishes to testify'
faces certain risks 2 when he steps into the witness box. The risks such
a defendant engenders certainly include the possibility of having his prior
criminal convictions brought up by the prosecution, for purposes of
impeaching his testimony. 3 In essence, the defendant who takes the
stand, like any other witness, places his reputation for truth and veracity
into issue. 4 The theory behind this general rule emanates from the belief
that the defendant's testimony can be no more credible than the defendant
himself. 5 Therefore, the prosecution is given the right, under certain
*Assistant Stark County Prosecuting Attorney; J.D., University of Akron School of
Law; B.B.A., Kent State University.
t Legal Intern in the Stark County Prosecutor's Office.
1 Every criminal defendant has an absolute right to remain silent and hence, to decline
to testify, U. S. CONST. amend. V. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
2 See Stone, Cross-Examination by the Prosecution at Common Law and Under the
Criminal Evidence Act, 1898: A Commentary on Maxwell v. Director of Public
Prosecutions,51 L.Q. REv. 443 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Stone, Cross-Examination].
3 At common law persons convicted of certain crimes were disqualified from testifying
as witnesses, 1 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 373, at 514 (16th ed. 1899); 2 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 519, at 608 (3d ed. 1940). Modern statutes, however, now permit the
previously convicted witness or defendant to testify, but grant the prosecution
the opportunity to attack the witness' credibility by the use of the individual's
previous convictions, those convictions to weigh inferentially upon the believability of
the testimony given. McCORMICK's HANDBooK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 43, at 85
(2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICKI.
4 Stone, Cross-Examination, supra note 2, at 454:
The defendant who goes into the witness box acquires a new role in the
proceedings, that of a witness... entirely separate from his role as defendant,
and when he assumes it, he assumes ... the burdens and benefits attaching to
the role of witness.... Among the burdens is the risk of being examined as to
credibility.
See also 2 WHARTON's CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 478, at 444-45 (13th ed. 1972):
A defendant who testifies in his own behalf puts his credibility in issue the
same as any other witness, even though no evidence has been adduced of his
good character or reputation. In general, the same rules relating to impeachment,
which are applicable to an ordinary witness, apply to the defendant.
5 MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 41, at 81: "The character of a witness for truthfulness
or mendacity is relevant circumstantial evidence on the question of the truth of
particular testimony of the witness."
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limitations,6 to attack the credibility of the defendant and his testimony
by inquiring into his past criminal "conduct."
While the foregoing discussion may be regarded as a generally
acceptable statement of the law, jurisdictions throughout the United States
vary greatly on the specific point regarding which particular criminal
7
convictions may be raised for the purposes of impeachment. Many
jurisdictions allow inquiry as to any conviction for a crime involving
9
moral turpitude.8 Others permit inquiry as to convictions for felonies, or
"infamous crimes"'" which may be classified as crimes involving crimen
jalsi."1 Still others permit the trial judge at his discretion to determine
whether or not the defendant's prior criminal convictions affect his
credibility as a witness.1 The Uniform Rules of Evidence l 3 provide for
the impeachment of a witness by the use of prior convictions for crimes
involving dishonesty or false statement. If the witness also happens to be
the defendant, no evidence of his prior criminal convictions is admissible
under the Uniform Rules, unless he has first introduced evidence tending
5
to support his own credibility. 14 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a
defendant's credibility may be attacked by the use of prior criminal convictions punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year (i.e.,
6
felonies), or by the use of those involving dishonesty or false statement.'
Irrespective of the particular rule followed, courts permit inquiry into
this area because of a rather strong belief that it would be misleading to
the fact finder, to allow a previously convicted defendant to testify as if he
were a "witness of blameless life .... ,,17 While it is true that every
6 1 UNDERHILL'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 242, at 751 (6th ed. 1973). The right to attack

the credibility of a defendant or witness is granted for the purpose of enabling
fact finder to weigh his testimony in light of his previous actions. It can serve
other purpose, and in the case of a jury trial, the jury must be instructed as to
limited purpose that the evidence is to serve. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554,

the
no
the
561

(1967).

7 See McCoamicK, supra note 3, § 43, at 85-86.
8 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 434 (1960).
9
See, e.g., CAL. Evi. CODE § 788 (West 1968).
10 See, e.g., People v. Birdette, 22 11. 2d 577, 177 N.E.2d 170 (1961).
3 See McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 43, at 84-85.
12 See Burgess v. State, 161 Md. 162, 155 A. 153 (1931). See also Gordon v. United
States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968), modifying
Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Both Gordon and Luck were
legislatively overruled by D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (Supp. 1972), and the judicial
discretion theretofore exercised was removed.
13The Uniform Rules of Evidence were drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved at its annual conference in 1953.
14UInFORM RULES oF EVIDENCE, Rule 21 (1953). See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE,
Rule 106 (1942).
15 The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted into law on January 2, 1975, to take
effect 180 days from the date of enactment, See Pub, L. No. 93-595 (Jan. 2, 1975).
16 FED. R. EvED. 609(a).
17 McCORMICx,

supra note 3, § 43, at 89.
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defendant who enters the courtroom starts his life "afresh,"' 8 it is equally
true that every such defendant brings with him his past, no matter how
haunting or insidious it may be.Y9 Therefore, insofar as it affects his
credibility, past criminal convictions may be revealed to enable the fact
finder to weigh the defendant's testimony in light of his background.
IMPEACHMENT IN JUVENILE COURT ON THE BASIS OF
PRIOR JUVENILE COURT RECORDS

In adversary juvenile delinquency proceedings, the impeachment of
any juvenile who wishes to testify, 20 by the use of the witness' previous
adjudications of delinquency,2 1 is somewhat more clouded than the
aforementioned situation involving adult defendants.2 2 This confusion

arises, in part, from modern statutes relating to juvenile proceedings
which typically provide that a judgment, finding, disposition, or any
evidence given in a juvenile court shall not be used against a child
in any other court, and that a finding of delinquency shall not be
deemed to be a criminal convictionY3
An analysis of the various statutes leads to several possible conclusions:
1) They were designed to protect juvenile offenders from any
subsequent use of their delinquency records except for dispositional
,24
or sentencing purposes;
2) They were designed to protect juveniles from the possibilities of
having their juvenile records or any evidence given in juvenile court
revealed or used when such juveniles were transferred l to criminal
18 People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 197, 172 N.E. 466, 469 (1930).

19Any individual's past conduct obviously sheds some light upon his make-up. If the
past conduct involves acts of a criminal nature, those acts are relevant circumstantial
evidence of his inclination to speak the truth, MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 41, at 81.
Therefore, since all relevant evidence should be admitted at trial, 1 J. WIOMoRE,
EVIDENCE § 57, at 650 (3d ed. 1940), past criminal conduct can be revealed to inform
the fact finder of all relevant data.
20 As in the case of adult criminal defendants, juveniles have the constitutional right
to remain silent. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
21 As used in this article, the term "adjudications of delinquency" includes only those
adjudications for some violation of criminal law.
22 Inasmuch as there is very little case law on the question, there is room for
confusion and disagreement as to what the law is or should be. Compare 3A J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 980(7), at 834 (Chadbourn Rev. 1970) with MCCORMICK,
supra note 3, § 43, at 86 and 1 UNDERHILL'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 242, at 751 (6th
ed. 1973). Cf. 4 JoNEs ON EVIDENCE § 26.20, at 223 (6th ed. 1972).
23
E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2L5'1.358 (Page Supp. 1973). See 1 J. WIOMoRE
EVIDENCE § 196, at 673 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1972) for a voluminous collection of the
statutes. See also Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 561-63 (D.C. Cir. 1959) for a
copious list of authorities holding that juvenile court proceedings are not criminal
cases. But see GAULT: WHAT NOW FOR THE JUVENILE COURT (V. Nordin ed. 1968).
24
See 4 JONES ON EVIDENCE § 26.20, at 223 (6th ed. 1972); MCCORMICK, supra note 3,
§ 43, at 86; 1 UNDEm L'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 242, at 751 (6th ed. 1973). See
also Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
25Almost all states provide for the transfer of juvenile offenders to criminal court to
be tried as adult defendants, see, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (Page Supp.
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court to be tried as adultsF6 or when they later became adult
2
defendants,2 or when they testified outside of juvenile court;
3) They were designed to protect juvenile offenders from the
possibility of having their prior juvenile records brought up for
as habitual criminals, after they
purposes of treating such offenders
2
reached the age of majority. 9
Each of these possible interpretations has received some support from
31
30
highly respected commentators, and various writers. In addition, a few
in reference to this
statutes
the
construe
to
courts have had the opportunity
32
conclusions.
different
somewhat
reached
have
and
question,
impeachment
For example, one Ohio court has recently interpreted a typical juvenile
statute, such as that mentioned previously,33 and has determined that a
juvenile defendant's previous adjudications of delinquency may be brought
up when he testifies in his own behalf at an adjudicatory hearing, for the
purpose of discrediting his testimony. The court held that these prior
offenses are admissible to show the juvenile's previous criminal behavior,
of the litigation.3r
and to demonstrate his possible interest in the outcome
In contrast to this decision, one federal court in interpreting a
1973). See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966); Schornhurst, The
Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: Kent Revisited, 43 IND. L.J. 583 (1968).
26See Malone v. State, 130 Ohio St. 443,200 N.E. 473 (1936).
27 See 1J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 196, at 673-74 (3d ed. 1940).
28 See

Brown v.United States, 338 F.2d 543, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1964). But cf. 3A J.

WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 980, at 834 (Chadbourn Rev. 1970).
29See 1 J. WI Omm, EVIDENCE § 196,at 673-74 (3d ed. 1940).
SOCompare 1 J. WIGMORE, EVmENCE § 196, at 673-76 (3d. ed 1940), and 3A J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENcE § 980, at 834 (Chadbourn Rev. 1970) with MCCORMICK, supra

note 3, § 43, at 86, and 1 UNDERHILL'S CRIMINAL EviDENCE § 242, at 751 (6th ed.
1973).
31See Comment, Inferential Impeachment: The Presence of Parole Officers at
Subsequent Juvenile Adjudications, 55 MARQ. L. REv. 349 (1972); Comment,
Evidence-Impeachment of Witnesses-Use of Adjudications of Juvenile Delinquency
and Specific Acts of Misconduct Committed by Juveniles, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 406
(1958); Annot., 147 A.L.R. 443 (1943).
32
See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Thomas v.
United States, 121 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1941); State v. Kelley, 169 La. 753, 126 So. 49
(1930); People v. Smallwood, 306 Mich. 49, 10 N.W.2d 303 (1943); State v.
Marinski, 139 Ohio St. 559, 41 N.E.2d 387 (1942); Malone v. State, 130 Ohio St.
443, 200 N.E. 473 (1936); In re Benthune, No. CA-4057 (Ct. App., 5th Dist. Ohio,
Nov. 18, 1974); State v. Hale, 21 Ohio App. 2d 207, 256 N.E,2d 239 (1969).
S3See text accompanying note 24 supra. See also Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.358
(Page Supp. 1973), which provides in part:
The judgment rendered by the [juvenile court... shall not impose any of the
civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by conviction of crime in that the child is
not a criminal by reason of such adjudication .... The disposition of a child
under the judgment rendered or any evidence given in [juvenile] court is not
admissible as evidence against the child in any other case or proceeding in
any other court....
S4In re Benthune, No. CA-4057 (Ct. App., 5th Dist. Ohio, Nov.18, 1974).
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juvenile statute 3 very similar to the Ohio law, determined that the overall
rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile court system forbade any use of
previous adjudications of delinquency to impeach the testimony of a
juvenile witness in juvenile court.3 6 The court expressly held:
As the language of the statute expressly forbids the interpretation
that the disposition of a child in a juvenile court proceeding
constitutes conviction of a crime, and as nothing short of conviction
of crime is sufficient to warrant the inquiry which appellant was
forbidden to make, his contention [that impeachment on the basis
of previous adjudications of delinquency should have been allowed]
is completely devoid of merit.Y
A close reading of the statute interpreted by the federal court raises
serious doubts as to the propriety of the court's analysis. As the dissent in
the case poignantly indicated, the statute did not expressly forbid "[t]he
juvenile court itself... [from considering] previous misconduct... of a
witness ... where that misconduct is of such a character as will bear upon
the credibility of that witness."3 The dissent certainly believed that a
juvenile court's consideration of the previous misconduct of a child did
not "impose upon a witness any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed
by conviction, or treat a witness as a criminal, or constitute admission
of evidence against a witness, contrary to the [juvenile statute in
question.] .. ."39 The dissenter could not "conclude that it was the
intention of Congress, when it laid down the wholesome protections
of the Juvenile Court Act against treating children as criminals, to
blind the eyes of the juvenile judge or of a jury in the juvenile' 4court
to considerations vitally bearing upon the credibility of testimony."
The plain meaning of both the Ohio and the District of Columbia
statutes 4 ' indicates that they were designed to protect juveniles from the
use of their prior juvenile court dispositions, or any other evidence given
in a juvenile court, in any court other than a juvenile court.q The statutes'
35

Juv. Act of June 1, 1958 § 14, 52 Stat. 599, 600, D.C. CODE ANN. § 18-264 (Supp
V 1939): "The disposition of a child or any evidence given in the court shall not be
admissible as evidence against the child in any case or proceeding in any other
court...."
36
37

Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905, 908-09 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
Id. at 909 (emphasis added).

3S Id. at 911.
39 Id.
40Id.

41 See statutes cited notes 33 and 35 supra. The wording of both statutes is virtually
identical.
42The language of the statutes mentioned notes 33 and 35 supra, expressly provides
that an adjudication of delinquency given in juvenile court is inadmissible in any other
case or proceeding in any other court. This language "in any other court" can not
be ignored as its wording is plain and unambiguous. As the Supreme Court stated in
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917): "ITihe meaning of [a]... statute
must, in the first instance be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and
if that is plain .... the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its
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clear intent is not to preclude the use of such dispositional findings
or evidence in the juvenile court itself.43 To determine otherwise would be
to completely disregard the wording of the statute and the obvious
44
legislative intent.
The Ohio court, in interpreting the previously mentioned Ohio
juvenile statute, 45 implicitly determined that an adjudication of delinquency,
while not technically defined or regarded as a criminal conviction, carried
with it sufficient probative value as to bear upon the credibility of the
juvenile in question and his testimony. 46 This interpretation of the statute
does not impose any civil disability upon the juvenile, nor does it treat
him as a criminal. 47 Instead, this interpretation faces up to the true
realities of the situation and helps to further the truth finding goals
of the juvenile courts. 4
If the interpretation herein supported is correct, juvenile courts will
have the otherwise usual opportunity to weigh the testimony of any
juvenile defendant against the juvenile's previous actions. Furthermore, if
a juvenile has had prior court adjudications of delinquency, the court in
allowing questioning as to his previous juvenile court record may be
terms." The statutes in question do not forbid the use of an adjudication of
delinquency in the juvenile court itself. To hold otherwise would be to completely
disregard the language of the enactments and the express legislative intent.
43 The expressed intent of a legislative enactment can be gleaned from the plain
meaning of the statutory wording. See 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46.01-.03 (4th ed. 1973). The plain meaning of the juvenile statutes
being analyzed, indicates that the legislatures did not intend to forbid the juvenile
courts themselves from considering all relevant evidence, including impeachment
evidence. Had the legislatures intended some other result, logic dictates that some
other wording would have been utilized, e.g.:
A judgment rendered by a juvenile court or any evidence given in such court
shall not be admissible against a child in any other case or proceeding in any
court whatsoever, except that such an adjudication or disposition may be
considered by any court whatsoever for dispositional or sentencing purposes.
[Author's example.]
See In re Benthune, No. CA-4057 (Ct. App., 5th Dist. Ohio, Nov. 18, 1974). See
also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), suggesting that such language as that
offered could be constitutionally impermissible when balanced against the rights of
a criminal defendant
44
When a statute's wording is plain and clear, that language cannot be ignored, and
it is not subject to judicial interpretation but application to particular facts. See 2A
C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (4th ed. 1973). In the

words of one federal court: "There is no safer nor better settled canon of interpretation than that when language is clear and unambiguous it must be held to mean what
it plainly expresses...." Swarts v. Siegel, 117 F. 13, 18-19 (8th Cir. 1902).
4
5OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.358 (Page Supp. 1973). See note 33 supra.
4
6 In re Benthune, No. CA-4057 (Ct. App., 5th Dist. Ohio, Nov. 18, 1974).
47See Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (Stephens, J.,
dissenting in part): "For the juvenile court so to consider previous misconduct does
not in my view impose upon a witness any of the civil disabilities [disqualification in a
civil service examination, etc.] ordinarily imposed by conviction...."
48 Cf. State v. Hale, 21 Ohio App. 2d 207, 216, 256 N.E.2d 239, 245 (1969): "[A]
reasonable interpretation of [juvenile statutes] ... should not deny a judicial tribunal
a reasonable search for the truth, and, in so doing, best serve the purpose of justice."
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enlightened as to the juvenile's possible interest in the outcome of the
action. 49 Thus, the impeachment questioning process should in fact support
the system's truth determinative goals by enabling the court to consider all
relevant facts and circumstances. It would be a true miscarriage of justice
to require juvenile courts to determine cases through a "tinted window." 5
IMPEACHMENT OUTSIDE OF JUVENILE COURT ON THE
BASIS OF JUVENILE COURT RECORDS

Having supported the view 51 that impeachment of a juvenile
defendant in juvenile court is proper under the typical juvenile statute, the
question naturally arises as to whether juvenile records should be used as
the foundation for impeachment questioning outside of juvenile court.
This issue could arise, after the juvenile reaches majority and faces trial
as an adult, or where a juvenile testifies in a court other than a juvenile
court, as a defendant or a witness.

With some exceptions, 52 the courts have soundly held such questioning
to be improper in light of the prohibitions found in the typical juvenile
statute.53 An analysis of the statutes lends support to this general view, as
49

See In re Benthune, No. CA-4057 (Ct. App., 5th Dist. Ohio, Nov. 18, 1974). In
this case, the juvenile in question had previously, on another charge, received a
suspended permanent commitment to a juvenile institution. Inasmuch as he was almost
certain to be committed if adjudicated delinquent on his present charge, the juvenile
had a great interest in the outcome of the action. The fact that he was under a
suspended commitment was relevant evidence of his possible motivation for being
untruthful. But see Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In that
case the trial court indicated in an adult criminal prosecution that persons with prior
convictions were likely to commit perjury because of the harsher sentences imposed
upon repeat offenders. The Court of Appeals reversed holding that the statement of
the trial judge was a misconstruction of the theory of impeachment. The court stated:
"One need not look for prior convictions to find motivation to falsify, for certainly
that motive inheres in any case, whether or not the defendant has a prior record.
What greater incentive [to lie] is there than the avoidance of conviction?" 370 F.2d
at 244.
50 See Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (Stephens, J.,
dissenting in part); State v. Marinski, 139 Ohio St. 559, 560, 41 N.E.2d 387, 388
(1942); State v. Hale, 21 Ohio App. 2d 207, 256 N.E.2d 239 (1969).
51 See text accompanying notes 25, 26 and 27 supra.
52
See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), noted in 43 U. CIN. L. REv. 647 (1974)
(right of confrontation outweighs state's police power to protect juveniles from being
impeached by the use of prior juvenile records); People v. Smallwood, 306 Mich. 49,
10 N.W.2d 303 (1943) (in a statutory rape prosecution, the credibility of a 15-year-old
prosecutrix may be attacked by the use of her prior juvenile court record); State
v. Marinski, 139 Ohio St. 559, 41 N.E.2d 387 (1942) (once a criminal defendant
testifies on direct as to his life history including a list of the various schools he had
attended, the prosecution may in rebuttal cross-examine the defendant as to his
incarceration in a juvenile institution, where the defendant had failed to mention that
fact on direct examination); State v. Hale, 21 Ohio App. 2d 207, 256 N.E.2d 239
(1969) (once a criminal defendant introduces evidence of his good character and
conduct, the prosecution may in rebuttal, introduce evidence as to the defendant's
previous involvement in juvenile court proceedings). See also FED. R. EvID. 609(d),
Pub. L. No. 93-595 (Jan. 2, 1975), which allows impeachment of a juvenile witness,
on the basis of juvenile records, in a criminal proceeding, where such would be
necessary for a fair trial.
53 See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1964).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1975

7

Akron Law Review, Vol. 8 [1975], Iss. 3, Art. 5

[V/ol. 8:3

AKRON LAw REvmw

do interpretations two and three, mentioned above. 4 These interpretations
seem to support the obvious meaning of the enactments and the overall
rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile justice system.
As opposed to the situation involving juvenile defendants testifying
in juvenile court, it seems that the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile
justice system would perhaps be destroyed, if an adult could be questioned
as to previous transgressions committed while he was under the age of
majority.5 5 Assuming arguendo, that the rehabilitative goals of the system
encourage the privacy and eventual elimination of juvenile records,5 6 there
seems to be an overriding interest in refusing to allow any impeachment
of an adult as to his previous juvenile record.5 7 Similarly, a juvenile
testifying outside of the confines of a juvenile court should be protected
from the embarrassment and possibly harmful degradation of impeachment
questioning in a public courtroom.5 8
IF IMPEACHMENT IN JUVENILE COURT IS PROPER WHILE
IMPEACHMENT OUTSIDE JUVENILE COURT

Is

IMPROPER,

DOES THIS VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION?

If impeachment of a juvenile in juvenile court is proper, and if
similar impeachment of a juvenile outside of a juvenile court or after
he becomes an adult is improper, the question naturally arises as to
whether this interpretation violates the constitutional safeguards of the
equal protection clause.5 9
The equal protection clause of the United States Constitution simply
protects members of the same class or grouping from unequal treatment
by a state, for an unreasonable or irrational reason.60 The clause does not
command that all persons be treated absolutely equally, but merely that
54 See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
55 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), rev'g 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965). The
Arizona Supreme Court had stated: "Mhe policy of the juvenile law is to hide
youthful errors from the full gaze of the public and bury them in the graveyard of
the forgotten past." 99 Ariz. at 190, 407 P.2d at 767.
56 See, e.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.358 (Page Supp. 1973) (providing for,
inter alia, expungement of juvenile records).
57 To allow impeachment questioning would totally defeat the rehabilitative goals of
the juvenile justice system. Such a view would enable prosecutors and others to use
juvenile records to haunt a person throughout his entire life. See Kozler v. New York
Tel. Co., 93 N.J.L. 279, 281, 108 A. 375, 376 (N.J. 1919): "We see no reason why
the Legislature may not enact that it is against the public policy to hold over a young
person in terrorem, perhaps for life, a conviction for some youthful transgression."
But see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
58 See Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1964): "ITlhe juvenile
himself has a protected interest [when testifying in adult court] in maintaining the
credibility of his public testimony."
59 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Juveniles are "persons" within the meaning of the
Constitution and are therefore entitled to the equal protection of the laws. See In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969); In re Brown, 439 F.2d 47, 51-52 (3d Cir. 1971).
0 Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (Jackson, J.,

concurring).
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if there is going to be some unequal treatment, there must be some
rational basis for it.61 If a state develops some classification which results
in unequal treatment for no justifiable reason, the classification must be
struck down as being repugnant to the Constitution. Correlatively, where
fundamental interests are involved 6 2 or where suspect classifications are
utilized,6 3 not only must the classification be reasonable, but the state
must also show a compelling reason for the statute's differentiation.
As a starting point, it appears quite reasonable to say that the juvenile
impeachment issue does not involve fundamental interests.64 Furthermore,
the difference in treatment granted to juveniles testifying outside of
juvenile court, or to adult defendants generally, is not based upon what is
presently thought of as a suspect classification.6 5 Therefore, the so-called
traditional equal protection test 66 should be utilized to examine the unequal
treatment mentioned above,67 to determine whether or not that treatment
violates the juvenile defendant's right to equal protection of the laws.
The crucial question to be answered in analyzing the interpretation
herein supported, is whether the unequal treatment is based upon some
reasonable foundation. If so, there can be no equal protection violation.
The limited impeachment position favored by this article furthers the
63
supports
truth determinative goals of the juvenile justice system;
the system's objectives of eliminating juvenile records after a specified
time; 69 protects juveniles from the degradation of being impeached while
testifying outside of juvenile court, 7 and lastly, helps to further the
rehabilitative goals of the system generally. 71 These four points surely
provide a reasonable justification, if not a compelling interest, for the
Rinaldi v. Yaeger, 384 U.S. 305 (1966). See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
63 Cf. Fronterio v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
64
Cases such as Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), have tended to define
61

62

fundamental interests as "basic civil rights" or "basic constitutional rights." See
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
The juvenile impeachment question does not seem to involve any of these basic or
fundamental interests.
65
Suspect classifications as they are commonly thought of, are based upon such things
as race, religion, ethnic background, etc., See Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969). The classification, in reference to the
juvenile impeachment question, is not based upon such a classification.
66
See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). See also Trussman and ten Broek, The Equal Protection
of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
6
7See text accompanying note 59 supra.
68
See text accompanying notes 49 and 50 supra.
69 See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
70 See text accompanying note 58 supra.
7
1From personal experience, this writer feels that juvenile court judges often consider
the first step in the rehabilitation of a juvenile offender to be one of telling the truth,
no matter what it may be. Therefore the impeachment questioning process may in
fact encourage a juvenile to speak the truth.
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unequal treatment involved. Therefore, under the traditional equal
protection test at the very least, the equal protection clause apparently
is not violated by the view espoused herein.
IF IMPEACHMENT OF A JUVENILE IN JUVENILE COURT
Is PROPER, DOES THIS INTERFERE WITH THE
JUVENILE'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW?

Although one possible constitutional attack to the juvenile impeachment issue has been discussed and analyzed, another constitutional
safeguard may have some application to this discussion.
72
In the landmark case of In re Gault, the Supreme Court determined
7
that the due process clause of the United States Constitution. had a vital
74
role to play in adversary juvenile delinquency proceedings. The Court
did not
Constitution
...
[the]
felt that "[I]t would be extraordinary if
in the
implied
care
of
exercise
the
and
regularity
require the procedural
' 75
phrase 'due process' [in juvenile delinquency proceedings]." Consequently,
"must
the Court held that adversary juvenile delinquency proceedings
76
measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.
Cases arising after Gault have generally determined that the
applicable due process standard to be applied in juvenile proceedings is
77
one of fundamental fairness. Thus, the Supreme Court has determined
that fundamental fairness includes, inter alia, the right to the assistance of
78
counsel; the right to confront witnesses; the right to remain silent; 79 the
right to an evidentiary standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; but
not the right to a trial by jury.80 No Supreme Court case to date has
specifically spelled out all the elements of a fundamental fairness-due
process standard applicable in juvenile delinquency proceedings generally.
However, the Court has extended only those standards which it deems
to be essential to the general goal of fundamental fairness. So far this
has been a somewhat more restricted standard than would be applied
in an analogous adult criminal proceeding. It appears quite likely then,
that only those standards deemed to be essential to due process will
be extended to juvenile proceedings.
72387 U.S. 1 (1967), noted in, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv.
69, 173-176 (1967); Comment, Waiver in the Juvenile Court, 68 COLuM. L. Rv.
1149 (1968). See generally GAULT: WHAT Now FOR THE JUVENILE COURT (V. Nordin
cd. 1968); Ketcham, Guidelines From Gault: Revolutionary Requirements and
Reappraisal, 53 VA. L. REv. 1700 (1967).
73 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
74 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967).
75 Id. at 28-9.
76 Id. at 30.

77 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970).
78 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
79
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
80McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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Therefore, the question to be asked in reference to this discussion, is
whether an interpretation which allows a juvenile to be impeached
in juvenile court by the use of previous adjudications of delinquency, is
so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process.
An extensive search of the available law has failed to uncover any
case discussing this specific question. 81 However, several cases involving
adult defendants have arisen which might shed some light on this problem.
These adult cases, arising at both the state8 2 and federal level,8 3 have
dealt with the question of whether due process is violated when a
defendant during cross-examination is impeached by the prosecution on
the basis of his prior criminal record. In these cases the claim was made
that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, was unable to consider
the prior convictions solely for the purpose of weighing the credibility
of the defendant and his testimony.84 Therefore as this theory goes, due
process was violated because the defendant was not afforded his sixth
amendment right to trial by an impartial jury.83 In the vast majority of
these cases, this claim has been rejected.8a
In contrast to the adult procedure, the juvenile process does not, as
a general rule, involve a trial by jury. In fact, the Supreme Court in
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania8 7 held that juveniles were not as a matter of
constitutional law entitled to a jury trial.88 Therefore, the claims which
have been made in some adult cases as to jury confusion in reference to the
impeachment process, have little or no application to the juvenile situation
where a jury is rarely involved. Even assuming that the claims put forth
in the adult cases have some constitutional merit, the dangers of violating
81 But see 4 JoNEs ON EVIDENCE § 26.20, at 223 (6th ed. 1972); MCCORMICK, supra
note 3, § 43, at 86-87, n.64.
82 See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 278 A.2d 89, 92-6 (D.C. App. 1972); State v.
Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971).
83 See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
84See Comment, Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior
Record Convictions Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching the Credibility of the
Defendant Witness, 37 U. CIN. L. Rav. 168 (1968).
85 Id.
88See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). But see State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii
254, 492, P.2d 657 (1971). In this context, Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968), overruling Deli v. Paoli, 352 U.S. 232 (1957), may have some application. In
the Bruton case, two adult defendants were jointly tried on the same charges. A
confession of one of the defendants who did not testify was introduced into evidence.
This confession implicated the co-defendant. Although the trial court instructed the
jury to consider the confession only against the confessor, the Supreme Court,
referring to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), held that such a limiting
instruction did not overcome the prejudice to the co-defendant and was in violation
of the co-defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. By analogy to the present
situation, perhaps a limiting instruction to a jury in reference to the limited purpose
of the impeachment questioning process does not overcome the prejudicial effect of
the evidence, and in fact deprives the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair
trial. This, however, is merely speculation and not the present state of the law.
87 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
88 Id. at 545.
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due process are certainly minimized and perhaps eliminated when no jury
is used, and a case is tried before the court, as is the usual situation in
the juvenile process. Surely a judge, as opposed to a jury, will have no
doubt about the limited purpose that impeachment questioning serves.
Assuming this analysis is well founded, another due process related
question arises as to whether or not all prior adjudications of delinquency
may be used for impeachment purposes. It would seem reasonable to
suppose that the fundamental fairness concept might in fact be violated
if all types of delinquency adjudications could be brought forth to impeach
89
a juvenile when he testifies.
In order for the process to remain fundamentally fair, the
impeachment questioning process should be limited to only those
adjudications of delinquency involving the commission of some crime
9
which bears upon the credibility of the juvenile defendant. Obviously,
there are many crimes which do not bear upon the credibility of an
91
actor who engages in deviant behavior. Therefore, those crimes should
not serve as the basis for impeachment questioning of a juvenile defendant
in juvenile court.
Inasmuch as the juvenile judge sits as both the trier of the facts and
applier of the law, the matter of what crimes should be used for
impeachment questioning should not be left to his discretion, because
that procedure would require some proffer of testimony before the
questioning was allowed. Even though the judge strives for impartiality,
such a procedure may have some unconscious but prejudicial effect upon
the court if the proffer should be excluded from formal consideration.
Therefore, a policy should be established to specify which particular
crimes bear upon the credibility of any juvenile defendant. The best
approach appears to be one which would allow impeachment on the basis
of only those crimes involving either crimen jalsi or moral turpitude,
inasmuch as these crimes certainly bear upon the credibility of any

89 If all types of prior delinquency adjudications were allowed, even those not really
bearing upon credibility, the process would certainly seem unfair.
90As to the probative value of different types of criminal offenses for impeachment
purposes, see Burg v. United States, 406 F.2d 235, 238 (9th Cir. 1969) (Ely, J.,
concurring). But see Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1964):
"Because of the purpose of the Juvenile Court Act and the absence of procedural
safeguards, a finding of involvement against a juvenile [in the commission of a
crime] does not have the same tendency to demonstrate his unreliability as does
a criminal conviction for the adult offender." This position, as expressed by the
Brown Court, in light of Gault, and the interpretation suggested here, seems dubious
to say the least.
91 See, e.g., State v. Russ, 122 Vt. 236, 167 A.2d 528 (1961) (conviction for traffic
misdemeanor barred from use as the basis for impeachment). See also McIntosh v.
Pittsburg Ry., 432 Pa. 123, 247 A.2d 467 (1968).
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individual who violates the law.9 2 In this manner, the juvenile court will
consider only those adjudications of delinquency which vitally bear upon
the credibility of the juvenile defendant. This approach would not
ostensibly violate the fundamental fairness-due process standard applicable
in juvenile proceedings.
CONCLUSION

When a minor commits a criminal act, the mere fact that he is
underage does not, from a practical standpoint, erase the fact that a crime
has been committed. He is not, however, classified as a criminal because
it is the law's policy to attempt to help him rather than to punish him.
Notwithstanding this fact, the criminal act that the juvenile commits still
bears upon his credibility as a witness, and when he takes the stand to
testify in his own behalf in juvenile court, the believability of his
testimony should be tested by his past criminal misconduct.
The plain meaning of the juvenile statutes in question supports this
interpretation, and in fact encourages it. Any other analysis would seem
to do violence to the statute's obvious intent while hampering the juvenile
courts' truth determinative goals.

92See 1 UNDERHILL'S CRrMINAL EVIDENCE § 242, at 750 (6th ed. 1973):

Where a crime involving moral turpitude is the standard for impeachment, it is
held that such a crime involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes to his fellows or to society which
is contrary to accepted and customary rules of conduct. Perjury, larceny,
murder, narcotics offenses, sex offenses, and filing fraudulent tax returns, all
involve moral turpitude. It is generally not involved in liquor offenses, gambling,
assault and battery, disorderly conduct, and breaches of military discipline."
See also McGee v. State, 207 Tenn. 431, 332 S.W.2d 501 (1960); Note, Impeachment
Evidence-PriorConvictions Involving Moral Turpitude, 12 ALA. L. REV. 194 (1960).
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